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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL BOUCHER, by and through
his Guardian, TORLA BOUCHER,
an individual, and JAMES
BOUCHER, an individual,
Appellants,
Case No- 900476
Priority No. 16

vs.
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba DIXIE
MEDICAL CENTER, EDWARD FOXLEY,
M.D., DAVID MOORE, M.D., KATHY
MARSHALL, R.N., and DOES 1
through 20, inclusive,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
APPEAL FROM A RULE 54(b) FINAL ORDER OF THE
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Whether this Court will assume the correctness of the

lower court's judgment where, as here, Appellants fail to cite the
record to support their contentions on appeal?
II.

Whether the lower court properly dismissed Appellants'

claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress pursuant to
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 and current Utah authorities,
which uniformly apply a zone-of-danger standard of recovery?

1

III. Whether the lower court properly dismissed Appellants'
claim for loss of filial consortium in connection with a nonfatal
injury because no such claim is recognized under Utah law?
DETERMINATIVE RULES, STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES
The determinative statutes and Rules are:

(1) Utah Code Ann,

§§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7 (1953, as amended); (2) Utah Const, art. XVI,
S 5; (3) Restatement

(Second) of Torts S 313 (1965) and its

accompanying comments, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Addendum

"A"; and

(4) Rule 24(a)(6), Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure;
The determinative case authorities are:

(1) Trees v. Lewis,

738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987); (2) Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771
(Utah 1988); (3) Dallev v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center,
791 P.2d 193, 200-01 (Utah 1990); (4) White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d
1315, 1318 (Utah App. 1990); (5) Hackford v. Utah Power & Light
Company, 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987); and Dralle v. Ruder, 529 N.E.2d
209 (111. 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case:

This is a medical malpractice action arising out of alleged
negligence in the treatment and care of Daniel Boucher, in which
Daniel's parents, James and Torla Boucher assert claims to recover
for (1) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (2) loss
of filial consortium.

2

B.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition By The
District Court:

1.

Plaintiffs/Appellants ("Appellants") filed a complaint

alleging medical malpractice against the defendants-Respondents
(Respondents) in the Third Judicial District for Salt Lake County
on October 25, 1989.

(Record (R.) at 5-16.)

Respondents moved

for change of venue.

Their motions were granted on January 29,

1990, and the case was transferred to the Fifth Judicial District
for Washington County.
2.

Respondent David Moore answered the Complaint. (R. at

17-25.)

However, Respondents Dixie Medical Center, a division of

IHC Hospitals, Inc., David Foxley, M.D., and Kathryn Marshall, R.N.
(Hospital Respondents), in response to the Complaint, filed a
Motion to Dismiss on December 7, 1989, and requested that the
Appellants' second and third causes of action be dismissed.

(R.

81-82.J1
3.

Respondent David Moore filed a motion to dismiss on the

identical grounds as the Hospital Respondents on March 5, 1990.
(R. 180-183.)
4.

Judge J. Philip Eves considered the motions, briefs and

oral argument of the parties and entered his Order on May 23, 1990,
a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum "B," dismissing
Appellants' second cause of action holding that the allegations of
x

The basis of this motion was that the second cause of action
(1) sought damages for Torla Boucher and James Boucher's loss of
consortium with their son, Daniel Boucher, and (2) claimed damages
for negligent infliction of emotional distress and damages incurred
by Torla and James Boucher in viewing their quadriplegic son. The
third cause of action sought hedonic damages. (R. at 5-16.)
3

James and Torla Boucher for negligent infliction of emotional
distress and loss of consortium with their child failed to state
any claim.
5.

(R. 302-304.)2

Appellants filed their notice of appeal from the May 23,

1990 interlocutory order on June 18, 1990. (R. 305-306).

The

Supreme Court noted the filing on June 25, 1990 (R. 307) and
assigned

Appellate

Court

No. 900299.

The appeal was

later

dismissed and remitted to the Fifth Judicial District Court on
August 27, 1990, for the reason the appeal was not taken from a
final judgment.
6.

(R. 318.)

On September 26, 1990, the trial court certified the

order of dismissal for appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, a copy of which is attached as Addendum
"C."

(R. 332-334.) Appellants filed a second notice of appeal on

October 1, 1990.
C.

(R. 341-342.)

Statement of Facts:

The Statement of Facts contained in Appellants' Brief goes
beyond the? Record and reasonable inferences which might be made
therefrom.

Therefore, Respondents offer the following facts to

accurately present and clarify the Record.

2

The judge also dismissed the third
hedonic damages because it was encompassed
cause of action. The portion of the order
cause of action is not a subject of this
conceded by Appellants.
4

cause of action for
by Appellants' first
dismissing the third
appeal, having been

1.

Late in the evening on June 1, 1987, Appellant Daniel

Boucher ("Daniel11), 18 years old and not a minor,3 was throwing
homemade bombs made of Co2 cartridges from the Man-of-War Bridge
near St. George, Utah.

One of the bombs exploded prematurely,

seriously damaging Daniel's right hand.

He was taken to Dixie

Medical Center and Dr. David Moore performed surgery on the hand
on June 2, 1987.
2.

(R. at 5-10.)

See Addendum "D."

Appellants claim that sometime during the early morning

of June 3, 1987, Daniel suffered an event, involving respiratory
difficulties, which resulted in loss of consciousness.
awoke, he was in a quadriplegic state.
3.

When he

(R. at 5-16.)

Daniel's parents ("Torla and James Boucher") assert that

they are entitled to recover for negligent infliction of emotional
distress

arising

out

of

the alleged

negligence

in care and

treatment rendered on behalf of a third person, their son.

(R. at

5-16, Plaintiff's Complaint at Ml 24-25.)
4.

James and Torla also claim that they are entitled to

recover for alleged loss of filial consortium as a separate claim
and component of damage due to the nonfatal injury to their son.
(R. at 5-16 and Plaintiffs' Complaint atflfl26-27, attached hereto
as Addendum "E.")
5.

It is undisputed that James and Torla Boucher did not

observe the incident involving respiratory difficulties or other
injury causing event to Daniel Boucher at the time he experienced
3

Medical records indicate his date of birth is June 11, 1968.
See Addendum "»".
See, also, Appellants' Brief, Statement of
Facts, at p. i.
5

them at approximately 4:30 a.m. on June 3, 1987.

It is also

undisputed that James and Torla Boucher were not patients of
Respondents or in any other way threatened with emotional distress
from medical treatment that was by its very nature directed at
them.

(R. at 69-80.)
6.

Likewise, it is undisputed that James and Torla Boucher

were not threatened with emotional distress likely to result in
bodily harm because of fright, shock or other emotional disturbance
arising out of fear for their own safety or invasion of their own
similar interests.

(R. at 71-73.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The focus of Respondents' Argument is upon Appellants1 failure
to state any recognized theory of recovery for either negligent
infliction of emotional distress or loss of filial consortium in
connection with a nonfatal injury under the facts of this case and
pursuant to applicable Utah laws.
In addition, however, significant procedural defects also
independently justify affirmance of the judgment of dismissal in
favor

of

Respondents

as a matter

of

law.

Appellants

have

completely failed to cite the Record on Appeal and thus, this Court
should assume the correctness of the judgment below.
The claim of Torla and James Boucher for negligent infliction
of emotional distress fails as a matter of law.

Appellants

completely ignore the zone-of-danger rule adopted by this Court as
the standard for recovery of damages.

Accordingly, Appellants'

arguments on appeal are inapplicable in Utah. Moreover, even under
6

the more liberal standards of recovery, now clarified by recent
California Supreme Court decisions, no recovery may be had for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. First, Appellants were
never in any zone-of-danger created by allegedly negligent medical
treatment. Second, James and Torla Boucher were not present at the
scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurred and
were not then aware that it was causing injury to their son Daniel.
Under these circumstances, there can be no recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress under any theory advanced by
Appellants.
For several reasons, neither can there be recovery for loss
of filial consortium in the instant case.

First, Daniel Boucher

is not a minor and Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (1953, as amended) has
no application to his parents. Second, the provisions relating to
wrongful death, including Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7

(1953, as

amended) and Utah Const, art. XVI, Sec. 5, both deal with the death
of

an

individual

Appellants.

and

have no application

Finally, a cause of action

to the

claims of

for loss of filial

consortium is fraught with numerous difficulties, including (1) the
absence of the right to recover damages for loss of spousal or
parental consortium in the case of nonfatal injuries; (2) the
invasion of the legislature's prerogative; (3) unnecessary and
burdensome expansion of relief to tangential relatives; and (4)
confusion of the trier of fact on issues of damages.

7

For these reasons, the order dismissing plaintiffs' claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of filial
consortium should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS OF
THE JUDGMENT BELOW BECAUSE APPELLANTS FAILED
TO REFER TO ANY PORTION OF THE RECORD THAT
FACTUALLY SUPPORTS THEIR CONTENTIONS ON
APPEAL.
This Court has consistently held that it will assume the
correctness of the judgment below, where, as here, Appellants do
not support facts set forth in their Brief with citations to the
Record.

Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987); and State

v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 1982). For example, in State
v. Tucker, this Court concluded that:
A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of
the trial court is that the defendant failed to refer to
any portion of the Record that factually supports his
contention on appeal.
In the instant case, Appellants offer absolutely no factual
support

for their contention that the lower court

improperly

entered judgment against Appellants on the issues of negligent
infliction of emotional distress and filial consortium.

Rather,

Appellants1 cited authorities and the accompanying fact statement
clearly demonstrate that the judgments of the lower court were in
keeping with the laws governing negligent infliction of emotional
distress in Utah and the lack of a cause of action for filial
consortium.

8

Appellants also mistakenly assume that deficiencies in their
pleadings and/or arguments before the trial court can be remedied
at this stage of the proceedings.

Indeed, at page 16 of their

Brief, Appellants "request that the [Supreme] Court grant leave to
amend

the

complaint

to

more

properly

and

allegations of the direct-victim liability."

fully

state

the

This contention and

request is not only improperly raised before this Court, but may
not be considered on appeal.
This Court has forcefully and consistently held that it will
not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Sorenson
v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 at n.l (Utah 1987); Topik v. Thurber, 739
P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah 1987); Inslev Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper
Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d

1341, 1347 (Utah 1986).

In summary,

Bouchers have demonstrated their intention to abandon any pending
efforts to modify their claims before the trial court by pursuing
this appeal without first securing a ruling from the trial court.
POINT II
THE CLAIM OF TORLA AND JAMES BOUCHER FOR
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW
A.

Utah Has Adopted the Zone-Of-Danger Rule As Its Standard
For Recovery For Negligent Infliction Of Emotional
Distress.

In Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988), this Court
recognized a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.4

However, it was careful to select a standard of

4

Previously, in Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982)
and Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961), the Utah
(continued...)
9

recovery that would effectively balance the needs of tort victims
in seeking redress for legitimate injuries, while providing a
reasonable

and

predictable

limit

on

recovery.

Contrary

to

Appellants' mistaken reliance on a broad "survey of the law of
other states," which could be satisfied by the specific facts of
the Johnson decision, it is the Concurring Opinion of Justice
Zimmerman, which states the majority view and determinative test
for liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress.5
This Court's opinions firmly state, without equivocation, that
Utah's test for imposition of liability for negligent infliction
of emotional distress is contained in the "zone-of-danger" standard
set forth in Section 313 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1965), as explained in the Comments accompanying that section.

4

(...continued)
Supreme Court had rejected, without analysis, a claim for emotional
distress to the parents of a child damaged by allegedly negligent
medical treatment: " [I]t is well established in Utah that a cause
of action for emotional distress may not be based upon mere
negligence."
5

Justice Zimmerman declared that:

"I agree that this cause of action does exist in Utah,
as the trial court held. However, I depart from Justice
Durham with regard to the legal standard by which such
a cause of action is to be defined in Utah. Her opinion
surveys the law of other states--a helpful exercisebut it declines to choose from among the various possible
rules because all seem satisfied in this case. If we
were to do no more, courts and counsel would be left
entirely without satisfactory guidance in dealing with
all cases but the present one.
Justices Hall, Howe and Stewart concurred in the opinion of Justice
Zimmerman. Johnson, 763 P.2d at 785.
10

Johnson, 763 P.2d at 785.

Pertinent portions of Section 313

provide as follows:
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional
distress to another, he is subject to liability to the
other for resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved
an unreasonable risk of causing the distress,
otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or peril of
a third person and
(b) from facts known to him should have
realized that the distress, if it were caused,
might result in illness or bodily harm.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application
to illness or bodily harm of another which is caused by
emotional distress arising solely from harm or peril to
a third person, unless the negligence of the actor has
otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to
the other. (emphasis added).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 (1965).
Since its acknowledgement of a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, this Court has consistently
applied the Restatement "zone-of-danger" rule as the standard for
recovery.

See Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 791

P.2d 193, 200-01 (Utah 1990); and White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d
1315, 1318 (Utah

App. 1990).

In Dalley, a patient brought a medical malpractice action
against her physician, among others, for a burn injury to her leg
which allegedly occurred while she was undergoing a caesarean
section delivery.

Part of the patient's damage claim was based

upon a demand for recovery arising out of negligent infliction of
emotional distress and reliance upon the decision in Johnson v.
Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988).
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In addressing the patient's

claim, this Court noted that Dallev was distinguished from Johnson
for the reason that the plaintiff in Dallev "did not witness the
injury itself."

Dallev, 791 P.2d at 201. This Court, relying on

the "zone-of-danger" standard of recovery, further held that:
ff

[A]wards for negligently inflicted distress arise when physical

or mental illness results from the emotional trauma itself."

Id.

In White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1318 (Utah 1990), the
Utah Court of Appeals explained that:
[T]he Utah Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d
771, 782 (Utah 1988), recognized that such an action may
be maintained, but the main opinion did not articulate
clear-cut guidelines for recovery. Justice Zimmerman,
in a concurring opinion joined by the other justices,
thus forming a majority of the court, set forth the
standards enunciated in section 313 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1965) as the test for determining
liability for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Id. at 785
Appellants completely ignore this accepted Utah rule of law,
apparently conceding the fact that they cannot recover thereunder,
based upon the circumstances of this case. In addition, Appellants
not only misapprehend the appropriate standard of recovery, but
also improperly suggest that the Johnson decision is "premised"
upon

"California

Supreme

Court

decisions,"

which

Appellants

mistakenly contend allow them recovery "either as direct victims,
and/or as bystander victims." (Appellants1 Brief at p. 10.) These
contentions emphasize Appellants1 misunderstanding of the newly
recognized

cause

of

action

and

the

decisions

governing

its

application in Utah.
First, the Johnson decision, as it relates to the majority
rule governing negligent infliction of emotional distress, was not
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premised on any California Supreme Court case.

Johnson, 763 P.2d

at 785. Second, Utah decisions relative to the issue of negligent
infliction of emotional distress clearly rely on the Restatement
zone-of-danger rule of recovery, which Appellants choose to ignore.
Finally,

both

Justice

Durham's

opinion

and

that

of

Justice

Zimmerman agree that there can be no recovery by bystanders under
the Utah "zone-of-danger" rule.

In summary, Appellants fail to

address the applicable rule of law in Utah and further fail to
justify the application of any other expanded theories of recovery.
B.

The Claims Of Torla And James Boucher Are Insufficient
To Satisfy The Utah Zone-Of-Danqer Standard Of Recovery.

It is clear that the claim of Torla and James Boucher for
negligent

infliction

of emotional

distress relates

solely to

alleged negligence with respect to care and treatment of their son,
Daniel Boucher or, in other words, alleged potential for harm and
peril to a third person.

In the instant case, Torla and James

Boucher were simply not within their son's "zone of danger."
Indeed, to be within the zone of danger, the Bouchers would have
had to be subject to the same allegedly negligent medical treatment
which they contend caused injury to their son.
at 785.

Johnson, 763 P.2d

No such facts are present in the instant case.

It is likewise undisputed that no conduct of the defendants
threatened either Torla or James Boucher with bodily harm, fright,
shock, or other emotional disturbance, arising out of fear for
their own safety or the invasion of their own similar interests,
except because of the alleged peril to their son.
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Under these

circumstances, Mr. and Mrs. Boucher have no right of recovery for
negligent

infliction of emotional distress because:

(1) the

defendant's alleged medical negligence was not, by its very nature,
directed at Mr. and Mrs Boucher; (2) Torla and James Boucher were,
at best, bystanders and not direct victims in this case for the
reason that they were not even in the hospital at the time Daniel
suffered the alleged injury causing event; and (3) the alleged
invasion of the Bouchers' interests is vicarious and only arises
because of alleged peril to a third person, their son.
Finally, bystander and other expanded theories of recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress are inapplicable under
Utah law.

In Johnson, the opinion of Justice Durham reviews the

various standards of liability, all of which seemed to allow
recovery under the specific facts in Johnson. The opinion of
Justice Durham then observes the following limitations inherent in
the "zone-of-danger" rule which was adopted by this Court:
States [such as Utah] that have adopted a zone-of-danger
rule have, in effect, limited recovery to cases involving
direct victims, disallowing recovery to bystanders.
Plaintiffs who are allowed to recover because they were
present within the zone-of-danger are direct victims
because the defendant breached the duty of care owed
them. Other witnesses falling outside of the zone are
denied recovery due to the lack of direct injury and
breach of a duty. (Emphasis added).
Johnson, 763 P.2d at 781-82.

The notes accompanying Section 313

are helpful in defining the zone of danger by distinguishing
between bystanders and direct victims.
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Comment

(d) to Section

313 articulates

some differences

between bystander and direct victim liability:
The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies only where the
negligent conduct of the actor threatens the other with
emotional distress likely to result in bodily harm
because of the other's fright, shock, or other emotional
disturbance, arising out of fear for his own safety, or
invasion of his own interests. It has no application
where the emotional distress arises solely because of
harm or peril to a third person, and the negligence of
the actor has not threatened the plaintiff with bodily
harm in any other way.
Thus, where the actor negligently runs down and kills a
child in the street, and its mother, in the immediate
vicinity, witnesses the event and suffers severe
emotional distress resulting in a heart attack or other
bodily harm to her, she cannot recover for such bodily
harm unless she was herself in the path of the vehicle,
or was in some other manner threatened with bodily harm
to herself otherwise than through the emotional distress
at the peril to her child. 6 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, James and Torla Boucher like the parent in Comment (d)
cannot recover unless they were themselves subject to negligent
medical

treatment

or

threatened

with

bodily

harm

from

such

treatment other than through the emotional distress at the peril
to their son.
Other courts which have adopted the "zone-of-danger rule"
consistently deny recovery to individuals, who like the Bouchers,
are not direct victims as defined by the Restatement rule.

For

example, in Malonev v. Conrov, 545 A.2d 1059, 1062-64 (Conn. 1988),
the court addressed the issue as to whether the daughter of a
victim of alleged malpractice may recover for a severe emotional
6

These comments to Section 313 were expressly adopted by the
Utah Supreme Court. Johnson, at 763 P.2d at 785.
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disturbance

claimed

to have resulted

malpractice perpetrated on her mother.

from

observing

acts of

In Malonev, the court

concluded:
Whatever may be the situation in other contexts where
bystander emotional disturbance claims arise, we are
convinced that, with respect to such claims arising from
malpractice on another person, . . . "there can be no
recovery for nervous shock and mental anguish caused by
the sight of injury or threatened harm to another."
Malonev, 545 A.2d at 1063-64.
Other decisions are instructive as to the limitations on
liability to bystanders such as the Bouchers.

For example, in

Villamil v. Elmhurst Memorial Hospital, 529 N.E.2d 1181 (111. App.
1st Dist. 1988), the plaintiffs went to the emergency room of
Elmhurst Memorial Hospital; the wife was in active premature labor
at the time.

While the mother was giving spontaneous birth, the

attending physician momentarily turned away from the delivery table
and the baby fell to the floor on her head and died in the presence
of the mother and father.
Under these circumstances, the Villamil court dismissed the
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
holding that:
Under the [zone-of-danger] rule, a bystander must be in
the zone of physical danger to the direct victim created
by a defendant's negligent conduct, has had a reasonable
fear for his own safety based on a high risk to him of
physical impact, and show physical injury or illness as
a result of the emotional distress caused by the
defendant's negligence.
Villamil, 529 N.E.2d at 1182.

See also Jacobs v. Horton Memorial

Hosp., 515 N.Y.S.2d 281 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 1987) (holding that there
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was no claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by a
wife whose husband was incorrectly informed he had pancreatic
cancer); and Owens v. Childrens Memorial Hospital, Omaha, Neb., 480
F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that parents were not in child's
zone of danger in case of improper diagnosis of child.)
This

Court,

in

adopting

the

"zone-of-danger"

rule,

acknowledged that:
[w]e cannot permit every claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress to go to a jury under such varying
standards as each trial judge may choose. We have a
practical obligation to articulate understandable
standards and to impose workable limits for use in the
Utah courts.
Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 785 (Utah 1988).

In adopting

Section

this Court

313, with

its clear

limits on recovery,

concluded that it is best to take "the more conservative approach
and adopt the Restatement rule, as written."

Id.

Accordingly,

recovery is limited to cases involving direct victims and cannot
be extended to bystanders such as Mr. and Mrs. Boucher. The wisdom
of this conservative approach is emphasized by the California
Courts1 contradictory and confusing collection of cases.7
7

In criticizing the varying standards of recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the California Supreme
Court has noted that:
Little consideration has been given in post-Dillon
decisions to the importance of avoiding the limitless
exposure to liability that the pure foreseeability test
of "duty" would create and towards which these decisions
have moved.
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 821 (Cal. 1989).
(continued...)
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C.

The Claim Of Torla And James Boucher For Negligent
Infliction Of Emotional Distress Fails To Satisfy Even
More Liberal Standards Of Recovery.

James and Torla Boucher have urged the adoption of varying
standards

of

recovery

for

negligent

infliction

of

emotional

distress, ranging from "direct victim" liability to contract and
foreseeability theories of recovery.

They place considerable

reliance on several intermediate appellate court cases that predate
the governing Supreme Court decision in

Marlene F. v. Affiliated

Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989) and
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).

In making these

arguments, Bouchers have mistakenly assumed that all of their cited
cases and varying authorities are presently accepted standards of
recovery from which a plaintiff may pick and choose.

Bouchers

reliance on outdated California case law is misplaced and in fact
serves to substantiate Respondents' arguments herein when reviewed
in the

context

of the most

recent

California

Supreme Court

authorities which, like the "zone-of-danger" rule, completely bar
any recovery in the instant case, as set forth in detail below.

7

(...continued)

The Thing Court also noted that "[t]he subtleties in the
distinction between the right to recover as a 'bystander1 and as
a 'direct victim' created what one Court of Appeal had described
as an 'amorphous nether realm' and have contributed in some measure
to the present difficulty in defining the scope of a [negligent
infliction of emotional distress] action." (Citations omitted.) Id.
at 823.
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1.

Mr. and Mrs, Boucher may not recover on either
"direct victim" or "contract" theories of
recovery.

Appellants James and Torla Boucher assert that they are direct
victims of medical malpractice because they are indirectly affected
by alleged medical negligence as to their son.

In Johnson, supra,

this Court noted that a direct victim is a person who is actually
within the zone of danger and against whom a duty is breached:
Plaintiffs who are allowed to recover because they were
present within the zone-of-danger are direct victims
because the defendant breached the duty of care owed
them. Other witnesses falling outside of the zone are
denied recovery due to the lack of direct injury and
breach of duty.
Johnson, 763 P.2d at 781-82.

In this case, the Bouchers were not

present within their son's zone of danger, especially where there
was no physician-patient relationship between James and Torla
Boucher and the health care providers.
In the most recent California decision addressing the issues
of contract and direct victim recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional

distress,8 the California

Second

District

Court of

Appeals held that where a father failed to allege the existence of
a psychotherapist-patient relationship with the individual whom he
had hired to treat his son, the father was neither a direct victim
nor a beneficiary to a contract for the purpose of recovering
emotional damages due to negligence.

Schwarz v. Regents of the

The Schwarz decision was rendered on December 13, 1990.
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University of California, 276 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. App. 2d Dist.
1990).
The Schwarz Court determined that the fact "that a third party
[individual

other

than

the

victim] thus

suffers

an

adverse

consequence does not mean the defendant's conduct is directed at
the third party."

Schwarz, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 479.

With respect to the contract issue, the Court also determined
that:
when parents arrange for the psychotherapeutic or other
medical treatment of their child, the "end and aim" of
the contract is to enhance the child's health by
ameliorating the condition requiring treatment. While
parents assuredly have a great interest in seeing their
child's health enhanced, their interest is not united
with that of the child. . . . The absence of such
closely unified interests tips the balance in favor of
nonliability.
id. at 480.
The Schwarz decision is in part based upon the principles
identified in Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic,
Inc. , 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989). In Marlene F., three mothers
brought their sons to the clinic to obtain counselling for family
emotional problems.

All of the sons were assigned to the same

therapist, who began treating the mother, as well, in each case.
The therapist believed the children's emotional difficulties arose
partially from problems in the mother-son relationships.

Later,

the mothers learned the therapist had sexually molested each of
their sons during counselling sessions.
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The

specific

circumstances

of

the

case

were

of

prime

importance to the court:
In the present case, the complaint explicitly and
expressly alleged that the mothers . . ., as well as the
children, were patients of the therapist; specifically,
that he "undertook to treat both [mother and son] for
their
intra-family
difficulties
by
providing
psychotherapy to both . . . ." (emphasis added).
Marlene F., 48 Cal.3d at 590-91.

In other words, the therapist's

tortious conduct was, by its very nature, "directed at" the mother
plaintiffs because the therapist treated the mothers directly and
the very purpose of the therapy for both mothers and sons was to
resolve

intra-family difficulties by improving

relationships.

the mother-son

Id.

In reviewing the Marlene F. decision, the Schwarz Court
determined that:
The clear implication [in Marlene F.] is that the court
would not have viewed the mothers as "direct victims" had
the therapist treated the sons only for the purpose of
resolving the sons1 individual emotional problems, even
if these problems led to family difficulties, rather than
treating the parent-child family problems themselves.
This conclusion is bolstered by the court's subsequent
language in stating: "It bears repeating that the mothers
here were the patients of the therapist along with their
sons, and the therapist's tortious conduct was
accordingly directed at both."
Schwarz, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78.
In summary, the Schwarz Court held that:
treatment of an ill child is undertaken for the direct
benefit of the child, not the parents. . . .
We hold
that when the negligence is alleged to have occurred
during the medical treatment of the child, the
defendant's conduct is directed solely at the child. .
. and not at the parent who enters into the contract
solely as a surrogate for the minor child who otherwise
21

could disaffirm it. In sum, the simple existence of a
contract between a parent and a medical caregiver to
provide medical treatment for a child is not in itself
sufficient to impose on the caregiver a duty of care owed
to the parent. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 481.
2.

The Bouchers may not recover based upon a
foreseeabilitv theory of recovery.

Even assuming arguendo, the expanded theories of recovery of
California

are

applicable

in

this

case,

which

Respondents

strenuously deny, James and Torla Boucher still may not recover
for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the facts of
the instant case.

In Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989),

the California Supreme Court concluded that limits on recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress must be imposed:
Even if it is "foreseeable" that persons other than
closely related percipient witnesses may suffer emotional
distress, this fact does not justify the imposition of
what threatens to become unlimited liability for
emotional distress on a defendant whose conduct is simply
negligent.
Nor does such abstract "foreseeability"
warrant continued reliance on the assumption that the
limits of liability will become any clearer if lower
courts are permitted to continue approaching this issue
on a "case-to-case" basis some 20 years after Dillon.
Thing, 771 P.2d at 829.
Based on its experience and distrust in the foreseeability
standard of recovery, the California Supreme Court concluded that:
a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress
caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of
a third person if, but only if, said plaintiff : (1) is
closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at
the scene of the injury producing event at the time it
occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the
victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional
distress -- a reaction beyond that which would be
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anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not
an abnormal response to the circumstances.
(emphasis
added).
Thing, 771 P.2d at 829-30.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Bouchers fail
to satisfy the second element in Thing, namely, that they must have
been

present at the scene of the injury producing event at the

time it occurred.

Thus, even under more liberal standards, there

can be no recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress
in the instant case.

As one court has noted:

There is an element of ficertaxnty of injurious impact
necessary to establish the requisite sensory perception
of the injury-producing event. Put simply, it is the
contemporaneous perception of the infliction of injury
on a closely related person that causes actionable
emotional shock to a third party bystander. Perception
of endanqerment, while potentially stressful, is
insufficient to cause legally cognizable harm, for the
stress has not vet ripened into disabling shock.
(Citations omitted.)
Hurlbut v. Sonora Community Hospital, 254 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. App.
5th Dist. 1989).

In summary, Appellants fail to satisfy any

proposed standard of recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.

Accordingly,

the Judgment

of Dismissal

should be

affirmed.
POINT III
NEITHER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7 (1953,
AS AMENDED) NOR UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE XVI, SECTION
5 PERMIT TORLA AND JAMES BOUCHER, PARENTS OF DANIEL
BOUCHER, TO RECOVER FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM WITH THEIR SON
DUE TO NONFATAL INJURIES SUFFERED BY HIM.
Appellants, Torla and James Boucher, rely on Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7 (1953, as amended) and Utah Const, art. XVI,
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§ 5 to support their claim that they may recover for loss of
society, companionship, and affection

(filial consortium) with

their son, Daniel Boucher, due to his nonfatal injuries. However,
reliance on these provisions is misplaced, and no such claim or
cause of action exists in Utah.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 (1953, as amended) and Utah Const,
art. XVI, § 5 pertain only to wrongful death.

Accordingly,

reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-79 (1953, as amended) and Utah
Const, art. XVI, § 510 to establish loss of filial consortium
damages by parents is inappropriate.

In addition, the cases on

which Appellants rely, Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982)
9

Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 provides:

Except as provided in Chapter 1, of Title 35, [Workers'
Compensation Act] when the death of a person not a minor
is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his
heirs, or his personal representative for the benefit of
his heirs, may maintain an action for damages against the
person causing death, or, if such person is employed by
another person who is responsible for his conduct, then
also against such other person. If such adult person has
a guardian at the time of his death, only one action can
be maintained for the injury to or death of such person
and such action may be brought by either the personal
representatives of such adult deceased person, for the
benefit of his heirs, or by such guardian for the benefit
of the heirs as provided in the next preceding section
[§ 78-11-6]. In every action under this and the next
preceding section [§ 78-11-6] such damages may be given
as under all the circumstances of the case may be just.
10

Utah Const, art. XVI, § 5 provides:
The right of action to recover damages for injuries
resulting in death, shall never be abrogated, and
the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any
statutory limitation, except in cases where
compensation for injuries resulting in death is
provided for by law.
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and Beaman v. Martha Washington Mining Co., 63 P. 631 (Utah
1901),both involve wrongful death.

There has never been any

dispute as to whether loss of consortium is permitted in wrongful
death cases. However, Utah has never permitted claims for loss of
consortium in cases involving nonfatal injuries, and plaintiffs
have cited no authority to support their position.
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (1953, As Amended) Cannot
Be Relied Upon By Appellants To Establish Loss Of
Filial Consortium Because Daniel Boucher Was Not A
Minor On The Date Of The Alleged Accident.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6

(1953, as amended) provides as

follows:
Except as provided in Chapter 1 of Title 35, [the
Workers' Compensation Act] a parent or guardian may
maintain an action for the death or injury of a minor
child when such injury or death is caused by the wrongful
act or neglect of another.
Any such action may be
maintained against the person causing injury or death,
or if such person is employed by another person who is
responsible for that person's conduct, also against such
other person, (emphasis added).
This provision only permits actions arising out of the death
or injury of a minor child.

At the time of the incident on June

1, 1987, by plaintiffs' own admission in their appellate Brief,
Daniel Boucher was not a minor. He was 18 years of age. Utah Code
Ann. § 15-2-1 (1953, as amended) provides that an individual's
majority is attained at age 18. Therefore, Appellants' claim that
Daniel Boucher's parents are entitled to loss of filial consortium
with their nonfatally injured son, who was not a minor at the time
of his injury is clearly not supported by Utah Code Ann. § 78-116 (1953, as amended).

Moreover, it is clear that Utah does not

recognize any action for loss of consortium where there has been
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nonfatal injury to a spouse, a parent, or a child.

In order to

fully explain why parents may not recover for loss of consortium
with a nonfatally injured child, whether a minor or an adult, it
is necessary to review Utah law with regard to loss of consortium
nonfatal injuries.
B.
Utah

Spousal Loss Of Consortium Is Not Permitted For Nonfatal
Injuries.
Code

Ann.

§

30-2-4

(1953,

as

amended)

has

been

interpreted to mean that no cause of action for loss of consortium
between spouses exists in the event of nonfatal injury.

This

provision provides:
A wife may receive the wages for her personal labor,
maintain an action therefor in her own name, and hold the
same in her own right, and may prosecute and defend all
actions for the preservation and protection of her rights
and property as if unmarried. There shall be no right
of recovery by the husband on the account of personal
injury or wrong to his wife, or for expenses connected
therewith, but the wife may recover against third persons
for such injury or wrong as if unmarried, and such
recovery shall include expenses, medical treatment and
other expenses paid or assumed by the husband.
In the case of Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Company. 740
P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987), a wife sought recovery for lost services,
society, companionship, advice and conjugal fellowship (consortium)
with her husband due to a serious, permanent injury suffered by
him.

This Court confirmed its prior decisions rejecting recovery

by one spouse for nonfatal injury to the other spouse and stated:
We adhere to our prior decisions and hold that neither
spouse has a right to recover for loss of consortium
under Utah law.
Id. at 1281.
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The Hackford case is only one of a number of cases decided
over the years disallowing repeated attempts by a spouse to recover
loss of spousal consortium damages when a mate is seriously
injured.

See, Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869 (Utah 1988); Gillespie

v. Southern Utah State College, 669 P.2d 861, 865 (Utah 1983); Tias
v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979); Madison v. Deseret Livestock
Co., 574 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1978); Ellis v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d
985 (Utah 1972); and Black v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 470 (D.
Utah 1967).

Moreover, this Court has not retreated from this

position, even though it is one of only three jurisdictions in the
United States which does not recognize the right to recover loss
of spousal consortium damages for nonfatal personal injuries. See
Hackford at 1288.
C.

No Recovery Permitted By A Child For Loss Of Consortium
With Its Parent.

Likewise, in reviewing Utah law with regard to loss of
consortium claims by a child for association with a parent in the
event of nonfatal injury to the parent, the federal district court
has declined to allow such damages.

In coming to this conclusion,

the court in Wollam v. Kennecott Corp., 648 F. Supp 160, 163 (D.
Utah 1986), announced:
No authority has been brought to the attention of this
court wherein the Utah Supreme Court has dealt with a
loss of consortium by a child of an injured party.
However, counsel for the plaintiff acknowledged in oral
argument that there is little theoretical basis for
distinguishing between claims for consortium by a spouse
and a child. Accordingly, the Ellis case appears to bar
such claims by Justine Wollam, the child of the injured
party.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is
granted and plaintiff's second and third claims for
relief are hereby dismissed.
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D.

No Recovery Permitted For Loss Of Filial Consortium.

It having been determined that Utah law does not permit an
action by a spouse for loss of consortium damages resulting from
nonfatal injury to his or her mate, or by a child for a nonfatally
injured parent, the same conclusion should be reached with regard
to a claim for loss of consortium by a parent with an injured
child.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (1953, as amended) states that a
parent may maintain an action on behalf of a minor child. However,
even if Daniel Boucher had been a minor child, this provision
cannot support an action for loss of filial consortium.

It is

confined to allowing a parent to recover the value of lost services
and medical expense expended in behalf of the child.

(It may also

permit a parent to recover the child's general damages in trust or
in behalf of the child.)
At common law, it was recognized that a father had a property
interest in his childrens' services just as he had a property
interest

in

the

services

of

his

servants

or

his

wife.11

Nevertheless, at least one state which has a statute similar to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (1953, as amended), has held that such a
provision merely codifies the common law right of the parent to
recover damages for the loss of services or earnings of the child
and medical expenses incurred by a parent in the child's behalf.
This jurisdiction also specifically held that such a statute will

n

See
"Negligent Injury to Family Relationships:
A
Reevaluation of the Logic of Liability,1' 77 NW. U.L. Rev. 794
(1983).
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not support a parent's action for loss of filial consortium.12
Although there have been no Utah cases decided directly on point
dealing with this issue, Skollingsberg v. Brookover, 484 P.2d 1177,
1178 (Utah 1971) appears to follow this rule when this Court held
that a parent was entitled to recover for medical expenses expended
in behalf of a nonfatally injured child and for earnings due the
child under Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (1953, as amended).

General

damages were confined to the pain and suffering of the minor child.
At least one member of this Court has suggested that all
actions for loss of consortium damages for nonfatal injuries fail
to state a claim in Utah.

Justice Howe opined that such damages

are only proper if the legislature were to first make such a
determination.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Howe stated:

I fully agree with majority that if the right to
consortium [for nonfatal injuries] is to be given in this
state, the proper approach should be for the legislature
to do it by modifying the language of § 30-2-4. In doing
so, the legislature can give the right to both husband
and wife. It can also consider how far that right should
be extended to others, such as children who likewise
suffer when a parent is tortiously injured
. . . .
However admirable in the name of justice it is, to
attempt to compensate everyone who suffers at the hand
of the tort-feasor, boundaries must be drawn . . . the
legislature is peculiarly equipped to draw the lines.
We are not.
Hackford, 740 P.2d at 1288-89.
Other jurisdictions, although they may allow a parent to
recover for loss of services of the child and medical expenses
expended on the child's behalf, have refused to allow recovery of
loss of consortium damages claimed by a parent for the loss of

Beerbower v. State, 736 P.2d 596 (Or. App. 1987).
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society and companionship with a child when the child has not been
fatally injured.

In fact, this is the clear majority position

among those jurisdictions which have considered the issue.13
Appellants in their Brief claim that both Illinois and New
York recognize a cause of action for loss of filial consortium.
In fact, neither jurisdiction does.14

The Illinois Supreme Court

in Dralle v. Ruder, supra, provides what is probably the most
carefully reasoned opinion of any court which has considered the
issue as to why loss of filial consortium damages for nonfatal
injuries should not be permitted.
In Dralle. the parents argued that because loss of filial
consortium damages were permitted in wrongful death actions (as is
the case in Utah), such damages should also be permitted in the
Smith v. Richardson. 171 So. 2d 96 (Ala. 1965); Baxter v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 563 P.2d 871 (Cal. 1977);
Cimino v. Yale University. 638 F. Supp. 952 (D.C. Conn. 1986);
Dralle v. Ruder. 529 N.E.2d 209 (111. 1988); Deems v. Western Md.
Rv. . 231 A.2d 514 (Md. 1967) (dictum) ; Butler v. Chrestman. 264
So. 2d 812 (Miss. 1972); Wilson v. Lockwood. 711 S.W.2d 545 (Mo.
App. 1986); Siciliano v. Capital City Shows. Inc.. 475 A.2d 19
(N.H. 1984); Brennan v. Biber. 225 A.2d 742 (N.J. App. 1966), aff'd
239 A.2d 261 (N.J. 1968); Wilson v. Gait. 668 P.2d 1104 (N.M. App.
1983); Gilbert v. Stanton Brewery. Inc.. 295 N.Y. 270, 67 N.E.2d
155 (1946); Beyer v. Murray. 306 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1970); Michigan
Sanitarium and Benevolent Association v. Neal. 139 S.E. 841 (N.C.
1927); Beerbower v. State. 736 P.2d 596 (Ore. App. 1987); Ouinn v.
Pittsburgh. 90 A. 353 (Pa. 1914); McGarr v. National and Providence
Worsted Mills. 53 A. 320 (R.I. 1902); and Gates v. Richardson. 719
P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986). In addition, at least one court has held
that although it will allow loss of consortium by a parent with a
nonfatally injured child, that the parents1 action for loss of the
childfs consortium is limited to the childfs minority.
See
Shocklev v. Prier. 225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975).
14

Dralle v. Ruder. 529 N.E.2d 209 (111. 1988) (this case
distinguishes Dvmek v. Nyguist. 128 111. App. 3d 359, 469 N.E.2d
659 (1984) cited by appellants). See also Beyer v. Murray. 306
N.Y.S.2d 619 (1970) and White v. City of New York. 322 N.Y.S.2d
920 (1970), rejecting plaintiff's filial consortium claims.
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case of nonfatally injured children.

The Illinois Supreme Court

rejected this argument noting that the distinction between a claim
for loss of consortium in a wrongful death action and such a claim
in a case involving a nonfatally injured child lies in the fact
that the living victim retains his or her own cause of action
against the tort-feasor.

As the court stated:

Thus, there is no danger that the injury caused by the
tort-feasor will go uncompensated or that similar conduct
in the future will be undeterred.
Id. at 212.
In

addition,

the

Illinois

Supreme

Court

noted

other

considerations which convinced it not to extend to parents the
right to recover filial consortium damages for nonfatal injuries
to their children.
1.
nonfatal

These policy considerations are as follows:

To recognize claims for loss of society resulting from
injuries

liability.

to

a

child

would

threaten

enlargement

of

Grandparents, siblings and friends suffering similar

losses of society and companionship would also seek to bring claims
if recovery were to go unchecked.15
2.

Permitting both the injured victim and his parents to

pursue their own actions would invite duplicate recoveries.

In

light of the intangible nature of loss of consortium, a trier of
fact would find it difficult to distinguish between the child's
claim, involving pain and suffering, and the legally distinct but

'Dralle at 210.
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factually similar claim by the parents for loss of a child's
society and companionship.16
3.

In order to succeed in an action for loss of filial

consortium, the parents of a nonfatally injured child would be
required to present evidence of the diminution of their child's
society and companionship resulting from the injury.

This would

entail the difficult task of assigning a monetary value to the
reduced value of the parents' relationship with the injured child.
At the same time, the defendant would attempt to show the strength
of family bonds and greater appreciation for life arising from the
child's injury. This parental interest in minimizing the value of
the living child would contrast sharply with the situation in a
wrongful death action, where the opposite claim is made and loss
is presumed.17
As the Illinois Supreme Court noted,
The adoption of that rule [allowing recovery for loss of
filial consortium] would thus engender the unseemly
spectacle of parents disparaging the "value" of their
children or the degree of their affection for them in
open court.
Id. at 213.
In addition, because Utah law does not permit damages for the
loss of spousal consortium for nonfatal injuries which includes,
in addition to service, elements of companionship, felicity and
sexual intercourse, if this Court were to permit such damages, it
would be placing greater value on the right of association and

16

Dralle at 210.

17

Dralle at 213.
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companionship
spouses.

between a parent and a child than between two

In addition, a child is far more dependent upon a parent

than a parent upon a child, yet if an action for filial consortium
damages were to be recognized, this would place more value on
parental association with the child, than the child's association
with the parent.
Reben v. Ely, 705 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. 1985) is among those cases
cited by Appellants which they claim support a recovery of filial
consortium damages.

In this case, the Arizona Supreme Court based

its holding in favor of allowing filial consortium damages on the
grounds

(1)

that

loss

of

spousal

consortium

damages

were

recoverable in situations of nonfatal injury to a spouse and should
not be denied to the parents of nonfatally injured children, and
(2) that the expansion of liability was within the realm of the
judicial,

rather

than

the

legislative

branch

of

government.

Neither of these arguments are available under Utah law.

This

Court has repeatedly denied claims for spousal consortium and
Justice Howe has opined that the consortium issue is best left to
the legislature to decide.
In summary, because plaintiff Daniel Boucher is not a minor,
Utah Code Ann. 78-11-6 (1953, as amended) has no application to his
parents.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 (1953, as amended) and Utah

Const, art. XVI, § 5, both deal with wrongful death, and have no
application to the claims of James and Torla Boucher.
Court

were

to

seriously

consider

permitting

loss

Even if the
of

filial

consortium damages for nonfatal injuries, the concept is fraught
with difficulties.

As previously noted, (1) common law allowed
33

parents to recover only for loss of services and medical expenses
expended on behalf of a child.

This is the most that Utah Code

Ann. § 78-11-6 (1953, as amended) accomplishes; (2) permitting
filial consortium damages would constitute an invasion of the
legislative prerogative;

(3) since Utah does not permit a spouse

to recover loss of consortium damages for his or her nonfatally
injured mate and does not permit a child to recover such damages
for his or her nonfatally injured parent, permitting damages for
loss of filial consortium would have the anomalous effect of
putting a higher value on a parent's association with a child than
a spouse's association with his or her mate or than a child's
association with a parent; (4) permitting filial consortium damages
would justify expansion of similar relief to grandparents, aunts,
uncles and friends; (5)

allowing filial consortium damages would

create the danger of double recoveries or confusing damage awards
because of the confusion of the trier of fact between the pain and
suffering of the injured child and the parental claim of loss of
filial consortium; (6) finally, allowing loss of filial consortium
damages would require parents to denigrate or reduce the value of
the parent-child relationship in order to maximize recovery whereas
in wrongful death actions parents attempt to establish the value
of that relationship.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the District Court's Order
of Dismissal of plaintiff's causes of action for (1) negligent
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infliction of emotional distress; and (2) loss of filial consortium
should be affirmed in all respects.
DATED this

jf/j

day of February, 1991.
^

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

ii^rry R. Laycock

Attorneys

for

Defendant/

Respondent David W. Moore, M.D.
KIRTON, ftcCONKIE & POELMAN
By
Cha* Les W. Dahlquist, i:
Larry R. White
Attorneys for Defendants/
Respondents IHC, Inc., et al
35\1rl\10224.616\boucher.sct
a:\boucher.rct
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ADDENDUM "A"

Ch. 12

STANDARD OF CONDUCT

§ 3J3

§ 3 1 3 . Emotional Distress Unintended
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he is subject to liability to the other
for resulting illness or bodily harm ff) the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved
an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise
than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person, and
(b) from facts known to him should have realized
that the distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application to illness or bodily harm of another which is
caused by emotional distress arising solely from harm or
peril to a third person, unless the negligence of the
actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other.
See Reporter's Notes*
Comment on Subsection (1):
a. The rule stated in this Section does not give protection to mental and emotional tranquillity in itself. In general?}
as stated in § 436 A, there is no liability where the actor's negli-j
gent conduct inflicts only emotional distress, without resulting
bodily harm or any other invasion of the other's interests^ Such
emotional distress is importantfcgnly in so far as its existence
involves a risk of bodily harm, and as aifecting the damages
recoverable if bodily harm is sustained. See § 903.
6. The rule stated in this Section is unnecessary to make
the actor's conduct negligent and, therefore, to subject him to
liability if the actor should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm in some other manner, such
as by immediate impact. As to the effect which is to be given
to the fact that the act negligent because otherwise threatening
bodily harm results in the harm solely through the effect of the
actor's conduct upon the mind or emotions of the other, see
§436.
c. The rule stated in this Section which determines the
liability of a person who negligently subjects another to emotional distress likely to cause physical consequences differs from
the rule stated in §312, which determines the liability of one
See Appendix for Reporter's Hotes, Court Citations, and Cross References
U Beautement of Torts 2d]—8
H3

A-l

§ 313
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who intentionally subjects another thereto in one particular.
As is stated in Comment d under § 312, the actor who intentionally subjects another to emotional distress may under some
circumstances take theriskthat the other may, unknown to him,
have a resistance to emotional strain which is less than that of the
ordinary man although characteristic of a recognized minority
of human beings. On the other hand, one who unintentionally
but negligently subjects another to such an emotional distress
does not take the risk of any exceptional physical sensitiveness to emotion which the other may have unless the circumstances known to the actor should apprise him of it. Thus,
one who negligently drives an automobile through a city street
in a manner likely merely to startle a pedestrian on a sidewalk, is not required to take into account the possibility that
the latter may be so constituted that the slight mental disurbance
will bring about an illness.
Illustrations:
1. A is employed to drive B to a hospital. He is
informed that B is desperately ill. Nonetheless, he drives
at a rapid rate of speed and cuts in and out of traffic. He
thereby puts B in such fear of a collision that B suffers a
serious increase in her illness, A is subject to liability
toB.
2. Under the facts assumed in Illustration 1, A would
not be liable to B if he had no reason to know of B's illness.
Comment on Subsection (2):
d. The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies only where
the negligent conduct of the actor threatens the other with emotional distress likely to result in bodily harm because of the
other's fright, shock, or other emotional disturbance, arising out
of fear for his own safety, or the invasion of his own interests. It has no application where the emotional distress arises
solely because of harm or peril to a third person, and the negligence of the actor has not threatened the plaintiff with bodily
harm in any other way.
Thus, where the actor negligently runs down and kills a
child in the street, and its mother, in the immediate vicinity,
witnesses the event and suffers severe emotional distress resulting in a heart attack or other bodily harm to her, she cannot
fte« Appendix for Boportor'i Notoi, Court Citation*, and Crou Boftronces
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STANDARD OF CONDUCT

recover for such bodily harm unless she was herself in the path
of the vehicle, or was in some other manner threatened with
bodily harm to herself otherwise than through the emotional
distress at the peril to her child.
As to the rule to be applied where the other is so threatened
with bodily harm in another manner, and instead suffers emotional distress at the peril or harm of a third person, which results in bodily harm to the other, see § 436.
TOPIC 7. DUTIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Scope Note: The duties to take positive action imposed by
common law are generally duties to act with reasonable care in
order to give to others the aid or protection which the performance of the duty would afford them. The words "reasonable
care" are here used to denote that the actor is required to do that
which a reasonable man would believe to be necessary to afford
the aid or protection to which the other is entitled, but no more.
There are many cases, however, in which the actor deliberately fails to perform a duty which he knows is vital to the security of another. In such case, his misconduct is often either
intentional, that is, done for the very purpose of harming the
other or with knowledge that harm will certainly result from it
(see § 8 A), or is in reckless disregard of the other's interests
(see §500).
This Topic deals with only a part of the situations in which
there is a duty of protective action. The duty of maintaining
land and structures thereon in safe condition which is imposed
upon the possessor and lessor by virtue of their possession or
of a covenant to repair is stated in §§328E-379, which deal
with the liability of possessors and lessors of land. The duty
of careful custody which is imposed upon possessors and custodians of animate and other chattels likely to escape from the
place where they are put unless carefully guarded is stated in
Volume 3. The duties of inspection and disclosure of the defective condition of chattels which are imposed upon those who
use, dispose, or otherwise deal with chattels are stated in §§ 388408. As to the duties which are imposed by legislative enactment, see §§ 286-288 C. The duty to continue services gratuitously rendered or to perform a gratuitous undertaking and the
duty so to control the conduct of third persons as to prevent them
from causing bodily harm to others are stated in this Topic.
M— Appendix for Shorter*! Votes, Court Citations, and Cross Sstsrsaoos
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#

S0 HE? 23 PP! 22 52

Charles W. Dahlquist, II - A0798
Larry R. White - #3446
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELM&N
Attorneys for Defendants
IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba
Dixie Medical Center,
Edward Foxley, M.D. and
Kathy Marshall, R*N.
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL BOUCHER, by and through
his Guardian, TORLA BOUCHER,
TORLA BOUCHER, an individual,
and JAMES BOUCHER, an
individual,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs
vs.
Civil No. 90-3108

DIXIE MEDICAL CENTER, a
division of IHC Hospitals,
Inc., EDWARD FOXLEY, M.D.,
DAVID MOORE, M.D,,
KATHY MARSHALL, R.N., and
DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendants.

The Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Dixie Medical
Center, a division of IHC Hospitals, Inc., Edward Foxley, M.D., and
Kathy Marshall, R.N., and the Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of
David Moore, M.D., came on for argument before the Honorable J.

B-l

J&2

Philip Eves pursuant to notice on May 4, 1990.
represented by Irwin Zalkin.

Plaintiffs were

Defendants, Dixie Medical Center,

Foxley and Marshall were represented by Charles W. Dahlquist, II,
and the defendant Moore was represented by Larry R. Laycock.
The Court having reviewed the memoranda filed by the
parties, having heard oral argument and being fully advised in the
premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1. The motions to dismiss of the defendants are granted.
2*

Torla Boucher and James Boucher are dismissed as

individual parties to this action as to all causes of action
contained in the Complaint filed by plaintiffs for the reason they
have failed to state a claim or cause of action upon which relief
can be granted.

More particularly, they have not stated a claim

for negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium
with their child, hedonic damage, or any other cognizable cause of
action.
3.

The Second and Third Causes of Action contained in

plaintiffs' Complaint are dismissed for the reason they fail to
state a claim or cause of action upon which relief may be granted
independent of the First Cause of Action*

B-2

-2-

rt-tf £M

^?1 ±H'Z>V

4.

The defendants Dixie Medical Center, Bdvard Foxley,

M.D., and Kathy Marshall, R.N*, are granted twenty (20) days from
1
the date of entry of this
Complaint.
L U I S grder
UJ.US.L to
L U answer
CUiSWCJ. plaintiffs
pi<

DATED this _2$

day of May, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

£jg

^ ^ ^

J* P h i l i p Eves
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this / ^ r ^~day of May, 1990, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Thomas V. Rasmussen
Hatch, Morton & Skeen
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Irwin M. Zalkin
1145 Tenth Avenue
San Diego, California

92101

Attorneys for Defendant Moore
David W. Slagle
Larry R. Laycock
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

^L^J^y^f.
-3B-3

(L%U/,J>

J

ATiriENHUM

"C"

THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN #2693
HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: 484-3000

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL BOUCHER, by and through
his guardian, TORLA BOUCHER,
TORLA BOUCHER, an individual and
JAMES BOUCHER, an individual

AMENDED
CERTIFICATION UNDER
RULE 54(b) OF THE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE

]
]
I
]

Plaintiffs,

vs.

1

L ± v xo.

iiw •

-^ v !s~ .J .*. w O

!

DIXIE MEDICAL CENTER, a
division of IHC Hospitals, Inc.
EDWARD FOXLEY, M.D.,
DAVID MOORE, M.D.,
KATHY MARSHALL, R.N. and
DOES 1 through 20, inclusive

]
]
]
I

Judge IlilJ i.p J . Lives

Defendants.

The Motions

**

C
and

: ismiss
' '

ct

defendants

-

-x" -I Moore, M.

Dixie

Medical

: u Foxley, M.D.,
^

r'.dL./ . .rsna .

behalf

filed

;

.:smiss

:.*a- . :i

argument before the

l

Plaint „ : : -

-

'epresenteu

. iwu. t>. . K . :,

^e;,endanls , Dixie

Medical Center, Foxley ^*~ Marshall were represented ^u

Charles

W. Dahlquist, II, and the Defendant Moore was represented by
Larry R. Laycock.
The

Court

having

reviewed

the memorandum

filed by the

parties, having heard oral argument and being fully advised in
the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

The Motions to Dismiss of the Defendants are granted.

2.

Torla

Boucher

and

James

Boucher

are dismissed

as

individual parties to this action as to all causes of action
contained in the Complaint filed by Plaintiffs for the reason
they have failed to state a claim or cause of action upon which
relief can be granted.

More particularly, they have not stated a

claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of
consortium

with

their

child,

hedonic

damage,

or

any

other

cognizable cause of action.
3.

The Second and Third Causes of Action contained in

Plaintiffs1 Complaint are dismissed for the reason they fail to
state a claim or cause of action upon which relief may be granted
independent of the First Cause of Action.
4.

The Defendants Dixie Medical Center, Edward Foxley,

M..D., and Kathy Marshall, R.N., are granted twenty (20) days
from the date of entry of this Order to answer Plaintiff's
Complaint.
2
C-2

A
is nereir
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!:. " judgment —
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— Tcrla Pcur,v*~~ and James Boucher
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Uta.. Rules ol CiviJ Procedure.
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day of September, 199 0.
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IN THE DISTRIC
I

I^AAC UUUINII,

JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL BOUCHER", by and through
his Guardian, TORLA BOUCHER,v
TORLA BOUCHER, an Individual,
JAMES BOUCHER, an Individua] ,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT FOR NEGLIGENCE
IN THE PROVISION OF HEALTH
CARE; MEDICAL MALPR ACTICE

vs •
IHC INC., doing business
DIXIE MEDICAL CENTER, EDWA..
D A V I D MOORE, r
FOXLEY, M.F*
P . NT
-i r A
KATHY MARSH;
throuo^
LLO

<r

i II

,D ,

III

• M o i D i ^ /,.| pp.

judge:

J U W S TIMOTHY R. HAKSW

COMES NOW Plaintiffs, Daniel

Boucher, by and through

Guardian, Torla Boucher, Torla Boucher, an individual, and
Boucher,

an

individual,

defendants IHC

Inc.,

and

allege

doing business

the

his
James

following

against

Medical

Center,

as Dixie

Edward Foxley, M.D., David Moore, M.D., and Kathy Marshall, R.N.,
and Does 1 through 20, inclusive and each of them as follows:

I
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(NEGLIGENCE IN THE PROVISION
OF HEALTH CARE; MEDICAL MALPRACTICE)
1.

Due to

the incompetence

disability suffered by

as a

plaintiff Daniel

result

of the

Boucher, TORLA

mental
BOUCHER

was appointed the legal Guardian of plaintiff DANIEL BOUCHER.
2.

Plaintiff

has

Requirements (78-14-12

complied

U.C.A.)

with

of

the

obtaining

Utah
a

Statutory

pre-litigation

review of the this matter prior to filing this complaint.
3.

Plaintiff is unaware of

the true names of

defendants

Does 1 through 20,

inclusive, and therefore sues the

defendants

by such fictitious

names; when their

capacities

true names and

have been ascertained by plaintiff, plaintiff will move the court
for leave to amend this

complaint to set forth their true

and capacities; plaintiff

is informed

alleges that

fictitiously named

each of the
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and believes and

names
thereon

defendants was

in

some manner

liable

for negligence

and other

wrongful

conduct

alleged herein, and for the damages resulting therefrom.
4.

At all times herein

named herein

was

the

agent,

remaining defendant and
engaged in a general

mentioned each of the
servant,

all of them

and

defendants

employee

of

each

or in the alternative,

partnership with each remaining

was

.defendant,

and all of them, or in the alternative, was a joint venturer with
each remaining defendant,
acting within the

in doing the

course and

acts herein alleged

scope of, and

was

for the benefit

of

said principal, partnership, employer or joint venturer, and
acting with the full consent and radification of each

was

principal,

partner, employer or joint venturer mentioned herein.
5.

Plaintiff

is

informed

and

believes,

and

thereon

alleges, that at all times herein mentioned, defendant, IHC INC.,
(hereinafter IHC), is a

corporation licensed to do business

in,

and in accordance with, the law of the State of Utah and is doing
business as Dixie Medical Center, (hereinafter Dixie) within
according to

the

State

of Utah

or

in

the alternative

and
is

a

business enterprise the form of which is unknown.
6.
the IHC

Defendant Dixie is a
Group

Health

provisions and or
hospital

facility

part of and or a participant

Plan and

is

operated according

under the direction of
operating

for

the

including the plaintiff herein.
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IHC and is a
benefit

of

the

to

in
the

licensed
public

7.

Defendants Edward Foxley, M.D., (hereinafter

Foxley),

David Moore, M.D., (hereinafter Moore) and Kathy Marshall,
(hereinafter Marshall), were at the time of the alleged

R.N.,

incident

residing in Washington County, Utah.
8.

At the time of the alleged incident herein

defendants

Foxley, Moore and Marshall, and each of them were employed by
in the

alternative

obtained

staff

priveleges

from

or

defendant

Dixie•
9.

At

all

times

Boucher, (hereinafter

herein

Boucher),

mentioned
was

plaintiff

a resident

of

Daniel

Washington

County Utah.
10.

The plaintiff

has been

informed and

believes,

and

upon such information and belief, alleges that defendant Dixie is
authorized and

licensed

manage and control a
in St.

and did

conduct,

hospital (a general or community

George, Utah,

members of

to conduct

known as

the general

Dixie Medical

public, including

operate,
hospital)

Center, to

the plaintiff

which
herein

were invited as patients.
11.

At the time of the alleged incident herein and at the

time of the filing of this lawsuit, defendant Dixie was and is

a

hospital licensed to do business in the City of St. George, Utah,
and operates pursuant to the provisions or direction of defendant
IHC a Utah

corporation with its

principal place of business

Salt Lake City, Utah.
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in

12.

On or about

June 3,

incident herein, the defendants
each of them were

1987, the time

of the

alleged

Foxley, Moore and Marshall,

and

physicians and surgeons or nurses licensed

by

the State of Utah in medicine and surgery or nursing care in said
State and all of whom were engaged in a patient physician/nursing
relationship

with

plaintiff

Boucher

on

or

about

the

aforementioned date.
13.

At all times relevant to the allegations herein,

defendants Foxley,

Moore and Marshall,

and Does

the

1 through

held themselves out to possess and exercise that degree of

20,
skill

learning ability and expertise possessed and exercised by similar
medical practioners and

nurses in the

County of Washington

and

the State of Utah.
14.
injury to

On June
the right

surgical repair
June 2,

1987,

hand for

plaintiff
which

at defendant Dixie

1987.

unremarkable.

1,

The surgery
During the

was

Boucher

sustained

defendant Moore
hospital on

performed

the morning

uneventfull and

an

the

course of the post-operative

of

results
recovery

period plaintiff Boucher received infusions of Morphine in excess
of 100

mg. in

addition to

caused plaintiff to
midnight of June

Versed, Valium,

become heavily

2, 1987,

1987, plaintiff Boucher

sedated.

in the early

was noted

which

Immediately

after

a.m. hours

to be experiencing

breathing and by 4:20 a.m. was unarouseable.
-4-

and Fentanyl

of June

3,

stertorus

15.

Prior

to

obtaining

consent to perform hand

patient

plaintiff

Boucher's

surgery, defendant Moore failed to

warn

plaintiff of any risks inherent in or attendant to post-operative
recovery and or the infusion of Morphine alone or in

combination

with Versed, Valium and Fentanyl.
16.

At all times mentioned

and through their agents

herein the defendants IHC

and or employees and each and

of the remaining defendants,

everyone

Dixie, Foxley, Moore and

Marshall,

Does 1 through 20, and

each of them, failed to properly

the patient, plaintiff

Boucher, and

timely

and

appropriate

plaintiff, was

first

difficulties.

The

remedial

observed
patient

suffering from the effects

monitor

furthermore failed to
action

to be

when

the

experiencing

was observed

at

take

patient

respiratory

4:20 a.m.

of severe hypoxia which

by

to

be

subsequently

led to severe brain damage and spastic quadraplegia.
17.

At all times mentioned herein, the defendants IHC

and through their agents

and or employees and each and

of the remaining defendants,
Does 1 through 20,

everyone

Dixie, Foxley, Moore and

and each of them,

by

Marshall,

failed to timely call

for

the assistance of a physician and when called defendant Moore did
not respond

in

a

timely

or

appropriate

manner

and

further

defendant Foxley refused to respond and as such defendants
and Foxley
served to

failed to timely
decrease the

perform procedures

brain damage
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and

which may

extent of

Moore
have

spasticity

suffered by the plaintiff.
18.

As a

further

direct

and proximate

result

of

the

aforementioned negligence and breach of the professional standard
of care (professional malpractice) of the defendants and each

of

them the plaintiff patient was rendered in a comatose state for a
period of

approximately ten

(10) days

therefrom he discovered that
impairments, memory loss,

and

upon his

emergence

he had sustained visual and

speech

loss of knowledge, decreased

learning

ability, lack of ability to recognize family members or

friends,

that he was incontinent of bowel and bladder, that he was
to voluntarily
imprisoned by

move

any

of

the confines

his

extremeties in

of his

own body,

that

unable
he

the discovery

was
of

which all led to his suffering severe emotional distress, fright,
anxiety, and mental suffering.
19.

As a

negligence of

direct and

the defendants

proximate result
and

each of

of the

them in

properly monitor and take timely emergency action the
Boucher, suffered severe hypoxia

aforesaid
failing

to

plaintiff,

and as a result of that

oxygen

deprivation became brain damaged and a quadraplegic.
20.

As a

further

direct

and proximate

result

of

the

aforementioned negligence and breach of the professional standard
of care (professional malpractice) of the defendants and each
them the plaintiff
requires

has incurred

extraordinary

hospital and medical

care-taking,
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living

of

expenses,
expenses,

rehabilitation expenses

and in

time care and supervision

addition will

need future

rehabilitation, and medical care,

life
in

an amount exceeding One Hundred Thousand Dollars, ($100,000.00).
21.

As a

further

direct

and proximate

result

of

the

aforementioned negligence and breach of the professional standard
of care (professional malpractice) of the defendants and each

of

them

loss

of

loss

of

of 45

IQ

the

plaintiff

has

communicative skills,

sustained

diminished

previously acquired knowledge

loss

visual

and skills,

of

memory,

capacity,

a

and a loss

points to the below normal range.
22.

As a

further

direct

and proximate

result

of

the

aforementioned negligence and breach of the professional standard
of care (professional malpractice) of the defendants and each
them the plaintiff

has suffered economic

and wage loss and

of
has

suffered injury to his earning capacity which is permanent and in
an amount which

has not yet

been completely ascertained but

in

excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars, ($100,000.00).
23.

In addition, as a direct and proximate result of

the

aforementioned negligence and breach of the professional standard
of care (professional malpractice) of the defendants and each
them plaintiff has suffered severe emotional and mental
and loss of enjoyment of his life pursuits.
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of

distress

II
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)

For a separate
defendants

and

each

and distinct Cause
of

them

incorporate by reference herein

of Action against

plaintiffs

Torla

and

the

Boucher

in full paragraphs 1 through

23

of the First Cause of Action and further allege:
24.

At all times mentioned

and through their agents and

herein the defendants IHC

or employees each and every of

by
the

remaining defendants, Dixie, Foxley,

Moore and Marshall, Does

through 20,

or should

and each

their failure
profession

as

of them, knew

to perform
defined

according to
by

their

the

have known

standards of

community,

as

parents

of

Daniel

Boucher,

Torla

Boucher

that
their

herein-above

alleged, would result in severe emotional distress and
to the

1

suffering
and

James

Boucher.
25.

As a proximate result of the negligence of defendants

and Does 1 through 20, and each of them, plaintiffs Torla Boucher
and James

Boucher

have

distress, and have lost
their son.

suffered severe

emotional

and

mental

the comfort, protection, and society

The amount of said damages are unknown at this

Plaintiffs will seek leave

time.

to amend this complaint according

proof.
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of

to

Ill
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(NEGLIGENT IMPAIRMENT OF QUALITY OF LIFE)
HEDONIC DAMAGES

For a separate

and distinct Cause

of Action against

the

defendants and each of them plaintiff Boucher realleges each

and

every allegation

the

contained in

paragraphs 1

through

22 of

First Cause of Action.
26.

At the time of admission of patient plaintiff Boucher

to defendant Dixie's hospital,
Army, National

Guard and

Force and become a pilot.

Boucher was enlisted in the

his goal was

to transfer

average student
activities in

who

participated

addition to

swimming, football

and

to the

He had been working as a stock

and previously employed as a life guard.
in

He was a good

drama

and

recreational sports

baseball

and socially

Utah

clerk

to above

other

such as

Air

school
skiing,

interacted

with

numerous male and female friends.
27.

As a

further

direct

and proximate

result

of

the

aforementioned negligence and breach of the professional standard
of care (professional malpractice) of the defendants, and each of
them, the plaintiff Boucher

has suffered an impaired quality

life in that he can no longer learn and acquire knowledge to
extent his previous IQ of

130 points would have allowed him;
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of
the
is

no longer able to communicate
the level he was once able
potential nor

has

economic skills.

he
The

cause of action have

the

or interact in a social manner

to conduct himself; he has no
ability to

acquire

appropriate amount

of

not yet been ascertained.

any

at

career

employable

damages for

this

Plaintiffs

will

seek leave to amend according to proof.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Daniel Boucher respectfully prays for
judgment against

the defendants

IHC, Dixie,

Foxley, Moore

and

Marshall, and Does 1 through 20, inclusive, and each of them, for
all Causes of Action, as follows:
1.

For General Damages according to proof at trial;

2.

For Special Damages according to proof at trial;

3.

For costs of suit incurred herein; and

4.

For such other

and further relief

as the court

deem just and proper.
D A T E D : dcr-pa**.

zT

Mai

HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN

THOMAS RASMUSSEN,
Attorney for Plaintiff,
DANIEL BOUCHER
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
We do hereby certify that on the 4th day of February, 1991,
we caused four (4) true and correct copies of the Brief of
Respondents IHC Hospitals d/b/a Dixie Medical Center and David
Moore, M.D., to be served upon the following:
Thomas V. Rasmussen, Jr., Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Erwin M. Zalkin, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1145 Tenth Avenue
San Diego, California 92101
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
By
L^rry R. L^ypocK
KIRTON, ^McCONKIE & POELMAN
By
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